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Abstract. It is a common experience for present-day consumers making an
international payment via credit or debit card to be invited to choose the
currency in which they wish to have the transaction executed. While this
choice, made feasible by a technology known as dynamic currency conversion
(DCC), seems to foster competition, we show that the opposite is the case. In
fact, the unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in a natural fee-setting game
turns out to be highly asymmetric, entailing fees for the service provider
that always exceed the monopoly level. Although losses in welfare may be
substantial, a regulatory solution is unlikely to come about due to a global
free-rider problem.
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1. Introduction
For about two decades by now, it has been common practice in interna-
tional payment that users of a credit or debit card are invited to choose the
currency in which they wish their transaction to be executed.1 The tech-
nology allowing for this possibility, known as dynamic currency conversion
(DCC), relies on a protocol whereby the total in foreign currency is auto-
matically converted to the card-holder’s home currency. Proponents of DCC
have pointed to the fact that consumers tend to feel more comfortable using
their home currency because the uncertainty regarding the exchange rate in
the moment of payment is eliminated. Moreover, traditional utility theory
suggests that offering an additional alternative cannot be to the detriment
of a rational decision maker. In contrast to such reasoning, however, con-
sumer organizations have long warned that DCC is almost never beneficial
to the card-holder. Indeed, this suspicion has found unequivocal validation
through a large variety of case studies.2
In this paper, we study the economic mechanisms underlying DCC using
tools from both game theory and decision theory. Considered is a model of
price competition between a finite set of card-issuing firms and a single DCC
service provider.3 Demand for currency conversion is assumed to originate
from a heterogeneous population of rational consumers. However, in con-
trast to a standard Bertrand setting, we assume that the consumer’s choice
1For example, when checking out of a hotel on a weekend trip to Canada, a traveler from
the US could be invited to choose to pay either in US dollars or in Canadian dollars. This
choice might be presented on the screen of a small terminal used for electronic payment.
2For references regarding this point, see the next section.
3Allowing for competition among several service providers does not invalidate our con-
clusions. See Section 6.
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is framed by being split up into two dimensions.4 Specifically, provided that
the expected fee is not exceeding her willingness to pay for currency conver-
sion, the consumer chooses both (i) a payment card (i.e., the card-issuing
firm), and (ii) the currency of payment, i.e., home currency vs. foreign
currency. While fees are perfectly observable, there may be uncertainty re-
garding the way in which the choice of the payment currency determines the
entity that carries out the currency conversion. For the informed consumer
that is acquainted with the procedural details of the international payments
industry, the framed choice problem turns out to be equivalent to the one
considered in standard models of price competition. For the uninformed
consumer, however, the framing matters because she is not able to identify
the entity that will carry out the currency conversion, and consequently may
form only an expectation of the fee resulting from her choice. Uninformed
consumers may then find it optimal to randomize. In fact, as will be ex-
plained, this may actually be the unique best response for ambiguity-averse
consumers.5
We consider two settings, one in which DCC is prohibited, and one in
which no regulation applies. It is shown that, in either setting, the model
admits a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. However, the market out-
4We use the term “framing” here even though it is usually interpreted in a slightly
different way. Tversky and Kahneman (1981) observed preference reversal in objectively
identical choice problems with different semantics, such as stressing the percentage of
patients that deceased in a treatment versus the percentage of patients that survived.
In our example, the framing goes a bit further by creating an objectively different choice
problem, viz. the choice of the payment currency instead of the choice between using DCC
or not.
5As a result of randomized choice, our model will predict a home bias in the uninformed
consumer’s decision. Needless to say, ambiguity aversion has been used before to capture
the element of a home bias in financial decision making, albeit under a different set of
assumptions. See, e.g., Epstein and Miao (2003) or Uppal and Wang (2003).
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come depends dramatically on whether DCC is prohibited or not. Without
DCC, we obtain the classic prediction of Bertrand competition that issuers
bid each other down to marginal cost. With DCC, however, the equilibrium
takes a somewhat unusual form. Specifically, the service provider benefits
from the competition among the issuers, and optimally chooses a fee strictly
above the monopoly level.6
From a welfare perspective, the excessive fee chosen by the service provider
decreases the volume of cross-currency payment transactions below the ef-
ficient level, thereby leading to losses in consumer surplus larger than the
additional profits for the service provider. Although this might appear as
a clear-cut case for regulation, e.g., in the form of a general prohibition of
DCC, it turns out that the practical problem is not that easily resolved.
Specifically, the analysis suggests that the advent of the DCC technology
has created a global free-rider problem that effectively mutes any regulatory
initiative. Our analysis might thereby help to explain why the regulatory re-
sponse forcefully requested by consumer interest groups has not come about
until today.
A crucial assumption that will be made below is that consumers are
averse to ambiguity, and that they may optimally respond to such ambigu-
ity by randomization. According to the multiple-priors model (Gilboa and
Schmeidler, 1989), the decision maker ex-post adopts the prior probability
distribution that minimizes her expected utility. One possible interpreta-
tion is that the individual is conservative and focuses on the worst-case
6Pricing above the monopoly level may be part of a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium
with ex-post inefficient inventory choice (Montez and Schutz, 2018), but this result does
not extend to pure-strategy Nash equilibria.
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scenario, as if playing against Nature. Provided that ambiguity aversion is
understood this way, the set of priors considered possible may be effectively
reduced by randomly choosing one of the available options. Along these
lines, randomization may indeed be seen as a rational response to ambiguity
(Raiffa, 1961; Saito, 2015; Ke and Zhang, 2020), and we will follow this logic
in our analysis.7
Related literature. The present paper is related to three strands of lit-
erature. First, our analysis relates to the literature on payment cards and
platform competition. Seminal work by Baxter (1983) and Rochet and Ti-
role (2002) explored the economic rationale and efficient level of interchange
fees.8 While DCC is a revenue component from electronic payment that
might matter for the efficient level of interchange fees, existing theoretical
work has to our understanding avoided modeling currency conversion so
far.9 Second, our paper relates to the strand of literature that has studied
the market interaction between profit-maximizing firms and cognitively im-
perfect consumers.10 For example, Gabaix and Laibson (2006) have shown
that prices for hidden add-ons such as printer cartridges may be excessive
if some consumers are näıve. If all consumers are rational, however, firms
do not shroud information. Our analysis suggests that shrouding in the
7Consistent with this theoretical prediction, some of our colleagues to whom we pre-
sented our theory “admitted” having had recourse to randomization when faced with the
choice of currency in electronic payment. For evidence regarding preferences for random-
ized choice, see Agranov and Ortoleva (2017) and Dwenger et al. (2019), for instance.
8Interchange fees are paid by the merchant’s bank to the card issuer, and serve as a
Coasean compensation for the benefits that merchants have when they accept electronic
payments.
9See, in particular, the surveys by Chakravorti (2010), Verdier (2011), or Rysman and
Wright (2014). One reason for this might be that the revenue base of domestic transactions
may be larger than that of cross-currency transactions—even though the DCC fee level
tends to be much higher than the level of interchange fees.
10A useful survey is Armstrong and Vickers (2012).
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sense discussed may be profitable for merchants if consumers are merely
ambiguity-averse. Finally, our paper relates to the literature on equilibrium
price distribution (Varian, 1980; Narasimhan, 1988; Chioveanu and Zhou,
2013). However, while the model of sales may be seen as a variant of the
all-pay auction, our game is not easily interpreted along these lines. E.g.,
we always find a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. More generally, we
have not found imposed choice under ambiguity as a revenue source being
modeled in the existing literature.11
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews
the institutional background. The model is introduced in Section 3. Section
4 contains the equilibrium analysis. Section 5 discusses welfare implications
and the free-rider problem. Extensions of the model allowing for more than
one service provider are outlined in Section 6. Section 7 concludes. An
Appendix contains technical proofs.
2. Institutional background
2.1 Dynamic Currency Conversion
Dynamic Currency Conversion (DCC) is a service offered to consumers that
are in the process of making international payments, e.g., when paying by
card while traveling abroad, when withdrawing foreign currency from an
ATM, or when authorizing a payment in international online shopping. The
idea is that the consumer is allowed to authorize the payment either in the
foreign currency or in her home currency.12
11There are also some quite illuminating experimental papers on the issue that the
present paper aims to address. In particular, Bouw (2016) conjectured a role for ambiguity
aversion in a simulated ATM withdrawal. See also Gerritsen et al. (2014, 2017).
12The technical feasibility of DCC has been discussed in patent applications submitted
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Behind the scenes, however, the consumer’s choice of the payment cur-
rency determines the entity that carries out the currency conversion. Figure
1, adapted from Rochet and Tirole (2002), illustrates the settlement of card
payments in foreign and home currency, using the example of a card-holder
paying a merchant while traveling abroad. If the card-holder chooses to pay
in foreign currency, then the conversion is carried out by the card issuer.13
If, however, the card-holder chooses to pay in her home currency, then the
conversion is carried out by the so-called acquirer, i.e., by the merchant’s
bank that processes the foreign currency transaction.
Figure 1. Card payments in and foreign currency
For card-holders, DCC offers the advantage that they can choose a legally
binding price in their home currency as an alternative to the price in the
foreign currency. For the acquirer, the advantage of DCC is that it creates
around the beginning of the millennium. It seems that companies with a large share of
international retail business, such as car rental companies, were the first to offer DCC
in selected countries (cf. Keck and Herman, 2005). There are numerous DCC service
providers at the international level, including Elavon, Fexco, First Data, Monex, Planet
Payment, and Travelex, for instance.
13More precisely, the currency conversion is carried out by the payment network that
the issuer relies upon (e.g., in the case of credit cards, this could be Visa, Mastercard,
Discover or American Express). In general, issuers (e.g., banks and credit unions) set
the terms of the card and provide financial backing, while networks process transactions
among merchants, merchants’ banks, and issuers. American Express and Discover serve
as both issuers and networks.
7
an additional source of revenue.14 Finally, the advantage of DCC for the
merchant is that the acquirer shares the revenue from the conversion service
with her.15
According to de Groen et al. (2018), DCC transactions generate the
highest fees per transaction, followed by surcharges and interchange fees.16
E.g., Elavon processes more than five billion transactions, valued at nearly
$450 billion, around the world per year. Visa and Mastercard generated
about $7.2 billion and $4.9 billion revenues from international fees in 2018,
respectively.17
2.2 Consumer interest groups
Soon after its inception, DCC was under heavy attack from consumer in-
terest groups on the grounds that it implies a substantial service fee on top
of an exchange rate that tends to be quite disadvantageous (e.g., Keck and
Herman, 2005). This initial critique has never really ebbed away. In a re-
cent position paper of the European consumer organization BEUC, Allix
and Aliyev (2017, p. 2) summarized the complaint as follows: “When choos-
ing the DCC option in card payments and ATM withdrawals, the consumer
is financially worse off in practically every single case. It is almost impos-
sible for a consumer to make an informed decision when presented with
the DCC option, because of various nudging strategies put in place by the
14Specific revenue components include foreign transaction fees, ATM network fees, cur-
rency conversion fees, DCC fees, and exchange rate margins, where the terminology may
differ across institutions.
15Thus, merchant, acquirer, and service provider are three parties that earn a respective
share of the revenues from DCC. Our theoretical framework will abstract from this insti-
tutional feature and assume instead that the service provider is the sole decision maker in
this alliance.
16However, interchange fees for cross-border payment card transactions may differ from
those applied in national transactions (Vickers, 2005, p. 10).
17See Visa (2019, p. 15) and Mastercard (2019, p. 44).
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DCC service providers and merchants.”18 The same study surveys a large
number of case studies, covering issuer countries such as Germany, Norway
and the UK, in particular. These studies unequivocally confirm the view
that making use of DCC is generally expensive, with costs of 12 percent
over the next best option not being uncommon. A recent follow-up study
by Stiftung Warentest (2019) found the extreme case of 13.7 percent cost
differential from paying in Euro rather than in Koruna at an ATM located
in the Czech Republic. There are numerous media reports and studies that
ask why the ongoing scandal is not finally brought to an end.19
In sum, there is quite some evidence that DCC is indeed used to extract
excessive consumer rents. The precise way in which this is feasible, how-
ever, is not particularly well-understood. Below, we introduce an analytical
framework that provides a rationale for how the rent extraction is accom-
plished, why competition for currency-exchange services does not eliminate
the problem, and why the ongoing complaints have not triggered sufficient
action by regulators.
3. The model
This section introduces our analytical framework, which may be described
as a Bertrand model featuring an imposed choice on potentially uninformed
18The following quote from Flywire (2018) might help to illustrate such nudging strate-
gies. “Does the country of issuance of my credit card matter? — Yes, it’s important that
you pay with a credit card issued in your home country, as we expect our customers to use
cards denominated in their currencies. Your credit card will be charged the amount, and
in the currency of, your payment request. — If a different currency is used, your bank will
need to convert the funds from your card to the currency selected in the payment request
in order for us to receive it. This will result in additional charges for you. Please note
that it is impossible for us to know if a credit card is denominated in any other currency,
and additionally, we have no control over the conversion that your bank might perform.”




3.1 Firms competing for currency conversion
Considered is a model of price competition involving n ≥ 2 issuers, denoted
by i ∈ N ≡ {1, . . . , n}, and a single service provider, denoted by i = S.
Each of the (n + 1) competitors, i ∈ NS ≡ N ∪ {S}, independently and
simultaneously chooses a fee fi ≥ 0 for currency conversion. Here, the fee
variable is understood broadly, so as to represent the total cost of currency
conversion for the consumer. We assume perfect observability of issuer fees
f1, . . . , fn, and likewise of the service provider’s fee fS . Thus, all fees are
public information. Issuers and service provider are assumed to have access
to the same technology for carrying out the currency conversion. Moreover,
the service is homogeneous across competitors, i.e., there is no horizontal
differentiation.20 For convenience, marginal cost is assumed constant, and
equal to c ≥ 0. Both the issuers and the service provider are risk-neutral
and maximize expected profits.21
3.2 Consumer choice
There is a unit-sized population of consumers. Departing from standard
models of price competition, we assume that each consumer selects an al-
ternative from the set
γ ∈ {(i, µ) ∈ N × {H,F}} ∪ {γ0}, (1)
where i ∈ N denotes the issuer, µ ∈ {H,F} the payment currency, and γ0
20The case of imperfect competition will be discussed later in the paper.
21This specifies the objectives of the (n + 1) competitors in the case of n = 2 issuers.
However, to eliminate equilibria of limited interest when n ≥ 3, we assume that, among
fees that maximize expected profits, each competitor chooses the fee that maximizes her
market share.
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the outside option of not demanding any currency conversion. Thus, the
choice set is a two-dimensional set N × {H,F}, augmented by the outside
option γ0. If currency conversion is demanded by the consumer, i.e., if
γ 6= γ0, we will interpret µ = H as choosing the home currency, and µ = F
as choosing the foreign currency. Next, we specify how the consumer’s choice
in the case γ 6= γ0 determines which competitor will carry out the currency
conversion. For this, we assume that there are two states of the world,
collected in the state space
Ω = {ωH , ωF }. (2)
In state ωH , choosing the payment currency µ = H implies that the service
provider S carries out the currency conversion, and that the consumer is
charged the fee fS . In state ωF , however, choosing the payment currency
µ = H implies that the currency conversion is carried out by the issuer i
selected by the consumer in choice (1), and that consequently, the fee fi is
charged. In the case γ = γ0, the consumer isn’t charged any fee, because
no currency conversion takes place (e.g., because the consumer paid in cash
or did not buy the product in the first place). This way of formalizing the
consumer’s choice is motivated by the introductory example of the traveler
that, upon payment, i.e., if γ 6= γ0, is asked to choose a payment card, i.e.,
an element i ∈ N , and the payment currency, i.e., an element µ ∈ {H,F}.
3.3 The informational basis of consumer choice
Consumers may be of two types, informed and uninformed. We denote
by α ∈ [0, 1) the fraction of the consumer population that is informed.22
22In a straightforward extension of the model, consumers may have the option to get
11
Informed consumers are assumed to know the state of the world. Thus, the
informed consumer knows how her choice of the payment currency µ as part
of choice (1), provided that γ 6= γ0, determines the competitor that carries
out the currency conversion. Therefore, for the informed consumer, choice
(1) is equivalent to just choosing an element from the set NS ∪ {γ0}.
For the uninformed consumers, however, there is uncertainty regarding
how, again for γ 6= γ0, the payment currency µ selected as part of choice (1)
determines the competitor that carries out the currency conversion. Thus,
despite being completely informed about all prices, the uninformed con-
sumer does not know the state of the world, and consequently, faces a de-
cision under incomplete information. Noteworthy is the assumption that
the uninformed consumer, even after having made her choice (1), does not
know which entity carries out the currency conversion. In particular, the
uninformed consumer does not know if the fee applicable to her payment
will be fS or fi. This assumption marks the difference from the existing
literature on price competition.
3.4 Ambiguity aversion
Consumers are assumed to be ambiguity-averse in the sense of Gilboa and
Schmeidler (1989). Clearly, this assumption matters only for the uninformed
consumers. Indeed, informed consumers know the state of the world and,
therefore, understand how their choice of the payment currency translates
into a specific fee. However, this is not the case for the uninformed consumers
who do not know the state of the world, and consequently may have a
informed prior to making the payment. However, remaining uninformed may be optimal
when the opportunity costs to collect the necessary information are too high for the
consumer, e.g., because of time constraints.
12
problem selecting the payment currency that corresponds to the lower fee.
We denote by pH ∈ [0, 1] the consumer’s prior probability that state ωH
obtains. For convenience, the set of beliefs in the multiple-priors model is
assumed to be the entire set of feasible beliefs, i.e., P = {pH ∈ [0, 1]}.
We denote by f = min{f1, . . . , fn} the lowest fee chosen by any of the
issuers (i.e., disregarding the service provider’s fee fS). The following re-
sult shows that the optimal response for the uninformed consumer typically
entails randomization.
Lemma 1. If fS 6= f , then an uninformed consumer not choosing γ0 finds it
strictly optimal to randomize over the currency options µ ∈ {H,F} available










(pH ∈ P ). (3)
This implies that a randomizing agent eliminates the ambiguity in the belief.
If the two choices yield different utility levels, this is strictly superior to living
with the ambiguity. 
Lemma 1 states that an uninformed consumer optimally eliminates the am-
biguity in the belief through active randomization over payment currencies.
If one alternative yields a lower fee than the other in state ωH , and vice
versa in state ωF , then giving equal weight to both alternatives is strictly
superior to sustaining the ambiguity.
As explained in Ke and Zhang (2020), the conclusion of Lemma 1 de-
pends crucially on the decision maker’s subjective timing, i.e., whether the
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move of Nature (the choice of the prior p ∈ P ) is envisaged to take place
before or after the realization of the consumer’s randomized choice. Specifi-
cally, if the consumer assumed that Nature moves after randomization, then
she would still face ambiguity regardless of her choice. Thus, to obtain the
conclusion of Lemma 1, we need to assume that the consumer assumes that
Nature moves before randomization takes place. However, for the applica-
tion at hand, we believe that our assumption regarding subjective timing is
not entirely unreasonable.
3.5 Assumptions on demand
Let DI(f) and DU (f), respectively, denote the demand of the informed and
uninformed consumers at any fee level f ≥ 0. Given that each consumer
requests either one transaction or no transaction, demand corresponds to
the size of the subpopulation of consumers that possess a willingness-to-
pay weakly exceeding the fee. To ensure that the profit functions of the
competing firms are well-behaved, we impose the following assumption on
the differentiability and shape of the demand functions.
Assumption 1. (Demand for currency conversion)
(i) DI and DU are nonnegative and nonincreasing on [0,∞), as well as twice
differentiable at positive demand levels, with D′I < 0 and D
′
U < 0;
(ii) DI(c) > 0, DU (c) > 0;
(iii) DU is ρ-concave, for some ρ > −1, at positive demand levels.
Part (i) is standard, where differentiability of, say, DI at positive demand
levels means that DI is differentiable at any f ≥ 0 such that DI(f) >
0. It should be noted, however, that this condition entails that demand
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is responsive to fee levels.23 Part (ii) captures that there are gains from
trade for some of the informed and uninformed consumers, respectively.
Finally, part (iii) requires that uninformed demand is not too convex. More
specifically, this condition is a strict variant of assuming that DU is (−1)-
concave in the sense of Caplin and Nalebuff (1991), which ensures that the
service provider’s problem has a unique solution.24
4. Equilibrium analysis
This section studies the set of pure-strategy Nash equilibria of the non-
cooperative pricing game introduced above. We first consider the market
without DCC, then analyze the general case with DCC, and finally show
that the service provider always charges a fee above the monopoly level.
4.1 The market without DCC
A natural point of reference for the analysis is the case in which the service
provider has no access to the market. I.e., any currency conversion is known
to be carried out by the chosen issuer. Thus, each consumer chooses from
the set N ∪ {γ0}. Depending on the interpretation, this corresponds either
to a point in time at which the DCC technology was still unavailable (i.e.,
more than two decades ago), or to a situation in which regulators prohibit
the use of the technology.
23This assumption is not implausible in our view. For example, a tourist can easily
avoid using a payment card by having recourse to foreign bank notes or traveller cheques.
Further, in the absence of reasonable payment methods, a consumer may decide to step
back from the intended transaction altogether.
24By definition, the ρ-concavity of DU at positive demand levels requires that the trans-
formed function ϕρ(DU ) = (DU )
ρ/ρ is concave over the interval defined by DU > 0, where
a limit consideration takes care of the special case ρ = 0 (i.e., the case of log-concavity).
Since we also impose that uninformed demand is twice differentiable at positive demand
levels, part (iii) of Assumption 1 is equivalent to assuming that, for some ρ > −1, the
inequality D′′U (f)DU (f) + (ρ− 1)D′U (f)2 ≤ 0 holds for any f ≥ 0 such that DU (f) > 0.
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We denote by m the number of issuers that charge the lowest fee f =
min{f1, ..., fN}. As all fees are public information, and the distinction be-
tween uninformed and informed is eliminated, it is immediate that all con-
sumers are able to select an issuer that offers f .25 In the case of a tie, we
assume that a consumer is equally likely to choose any of the best offers.26
Therefore, the model without DCC is seen to be equivalent to a traditional
Bertrand game with constant marginal cost. The following result should,
consequently, not be too surprising.
Proposition 1. (Bertrand competition) Impose Assumption 1, and
suppose that the service provider has no access to the market. Then, m = n
and f = c, i.e., all the issuers set their fees equal to marginal cost.
Proof.27(Equilibrium property) Suppose that all issuers but i ∈ N set their
fees equal to marginal cost, i.e., fj = c for all j ∈ N\{i}. We have to show
that i finds it optimal to likewise set fi = c. Indeed, if fi = c, then issuer
i’s profit is zero. If fi > c, however, then issuer i loses all of her demand.
Therefore, issuer i cannot gain by raising fi above marginal cost. Similarly,
if fi < c, then i raises her demand but incurs losses. The claim follows.
(Equilibrium uniqueness) Clearly, there cannot be an equilibrium in which
f < c. Suppose, therefore, that f > c. Then, there are two cases. If fi > f
for some i ∈ N , then issuer i could lower fi to f − ε, for ε > 0 small, and
thereby attract the entire demand, which is positive by Assumption 1. If,
25This observation reflects our general presumption that consumers are well-informed
about card conditions and find it easy to switch between issuers. For a similar view, see
Evans and Schmalensee (2005, p. 271), for instance.
26Provided that any competitor tying on the lowest fee expects a positive market share,
the way in which ties are resolved does not matter for the equilibrium prediction.
27The proof is well-known, of course, and given for completeness only.
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however, all issuers charge f > c, then any issuer i could deviate in this way.
Therefore, f = c holds in any pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. Given the
second-order lexicographic preference for market share, all issuers set their
fees equal to marginal cost. 
4.2 The market with DCC
Suppose next that the service provider has access to the market. We will
show that, in this case, the service provider’s ability to frame the choice
(possibly in collusion with the merchant) implies that there is no true com-
petition between the issuers and the service provider.
By Lemma 1, the uninformed consumer randomizes between check boxes,
making it equally likely to have the currency conversion carried out by the
chosen issuer or the service provider. Thus, the expected fee for an unin-








Note that the condition for demanding the service, viz. that the uninformed
consumer’s willingness-to-pay must weakly exceed E[f ], marks the difference
to existing models of Bertrand competition.
The following result characterizes the asymmetric equilibrium in the
price-setting game with DCC service provider.
Proposition 2. Impose Assumption 1, and suppose that the service provider
has access to the market. Then, there is a unique pure-strategy Nash equi-
librium, in which the service provider charges a fee













strictly above marginal cost, while the issuers all set their fees equal to
marginal cost.
Proof. See the Appendix. 
Thus, when admitted to the market, the service provider sets a fee strictly
exceeding marginal cost, and makes a positive profit. Moreover, the anti-
competitive equilibrium is the unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium of the
pricing game. Intuitively, the fact that uninformed consumers eliminate
ambiguity by randomization renders their demand less price-elastic. As a
result, the service provider finds it optimal to forgo the meager revenues
from informed consumers, focusing instead exclusively on benefiting from
the ex-post suboptimal choices made (and regretted) by the uninformed.28
While our model might appear similar to the model of sales (Varian,
1980), there is a crucial difference regarding the condition for purchase by
uninformed consumers. Specifically, in the model of sales, uninformed con-
sumers purchase from a randomly chosen store provided that the price in
that store is low enough. In our setting, however, uninformed consumers,
while likewise randomizing, request the service provided that the expected
price is low enough. Put differently, the consumer knows what she is paying
in the model of sales, but she does not know this in our framework. As
shown above, this difference dramatically changes the nature of the equilib-
rium. For example, we find a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, which is not
28The fact that the service provider earns a positive profit relates our paper to the
literature on the so-called Bertrand paradox. E.g., as pointed out by Dastidar (1995),
the assumption of strictly convex costs may be used to obtain a Nash equilibrium in a
Bertrand game with positive profits. However, our set-up does not require strictly convex
costs. Relatedly, Spulber (1995) noted that asymmetric information regarding rivals’ costs
may allow to achieve positive profits. Again, our argument differs.
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common in a model of sales.
As discussed in Armstrong and Vickers (2012), assuming cognitive im-
perfections on the part of the consumers usually implies an externality be-
tween rational and näıve consumers. E.g., the increase of the share of ratio-
nal consumers in the population may force firms to offer more competitive
prices, making it harder to exploit näıve consumers. However, in our setting,
there is no such externality. Uninformed consumers are exploited by the ser-
vice provider regardless of how many informed consumers are around.29
4.3 Pricing above the monopoly level
Suppose for the moment that a single firm offers the service of currency
conversion to the uninformed segment of the consumer population. In that
situation, the firm solves the problem
fM = arg max
f≥0
(f − c)DU (f) . (6)
In analogy to the proof of Proposition 2, one can show that under Assump-
tion 1, the objective function in (6) admits a unique global optimum that is










We refer to fM as the monopoly fee. The following result was somewhat
unexpected to us.
Proposition 3. Impose Assumption 1. Then, the service provider sets a
fee strictly above the monopoly price level, i.e., f∗S > f
M .
29However, if the competition among issuers is sufficiently imperfect, the externality
may reappear because the service provider may then find it profitable to compete also for
the informed demand.
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Proof. When providing DCC as an option to potentially uninformed con-
sumers, the service provider solves



























We convexify the two problems (6) and (8) by considering the hypothetical
profit function
















where q ∈ [0, 1]. For q = 0, the function Π(f, 0) represents the objective
function of the monopoly, while for q = 1, the function Π(f, 1) represents
the objective function of the service provider when issuers price at marginal
cost. For any q ∈ [0, 1], the optimum is given by
fq = arg max
f≥0
Π(f, q), (11)






D′U +DU = 0, (12)
where we drop the arguments. We also note that f0 = f
M and f1 = f
∗
S . To
prove the proposition, it therefore suffices to show that the cross-derivative
of Π(f, q) is positive at fq, for any q ∈ [0, 1] (Milgrom and Shannon, 1994).
This, however, can be checked in a straightforward way.30 
We illustrate the conclusion of Proposition 3 with two examples.
30Indeed, taking the cross-derivative of (10), evaluating at f = fq, and finally exploiting
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·Dmax if f ≤ fmax
0 if f > fmax,
(13)
where Dmax > 0 and fmax > c are parameters. Then, the monopoly price is
fM = f
max+c
2 , while the fee chosen under competition among the issuers is
f*S = f
max. E.g., if c = 0, the fee charged by the service provider is twice as
large as the monopoly fee.31
Example 2. (Isoelastic demand) Suppose that
DU (f) = f
−η, (14)
where η > 1 is the elasticity of uninformed demand.32 To ensure a finite
optimum, we assume that c > 0. Then, the monopolist’s mark-up over












































Since, for obvious reasons, fq > c, this proves the claim.
31This example extends in a straightforward way to a more flexible, but still log-concave
specification of DU in which the term in the brackets on the right-hand side of equation
(13) is taken to the power of any γ ∈ (0,∞). In particular, as demand is strictly concave
for γ < 1, the conclusion of Proposition 3 can be illustrated also in that case.
32This example extends our analysis to demand functions satisfying limf→0DU (f) =∞.
In contrast to our earlier assumption, the population of consumers is no longer unit-sized,
which implies minor changes to the interpretation of the model. Otherwise, there are no
changes.
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In particular, we get that f∗S > f
M , as predicted by Proposition 3.
The fairly strong conclusion of Proposition 3 is derived under the assumption
that the issuers bid each other down to marginal cost. If, however, the
competition among these firms is less than perfect, or similarly, if there is
collusion among issuers regarding the fees for currency conversion, then the
service provider’s position weakens, resulting in a lower fee for the service
provider. In that case, provided that the share of informed consumers is
sufficiently large, the service provider might find it profitable to set her
fee below the monopoly level so as to attract those informed consumers.
However, even in the weakened position, the service provider will charge a
fee above the monopoly level as long as the equilibrium fee level charged
by the issuers stays sufficiently low to make it unattractive for the service
provider to target the informed consumers.
5. Welfare and regulation
This section gauges the welfare implications of introducing DCC.
5.1 Welfare analysis
As has been seen above, the service provider is in a very strong position.
In fact, with respect to pricing, her situation looks even more comfortable
than that of the ordinary monopolist. However, with respect to quantity, the
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service provider sells only half of the volume brought to the market by the
ordinary monopolist. It turns out that, in terms of expected profits, these
two effects just balance out. Thus, regardless of the shape of uninformed
demand, the service provider realizes precisely the same expected profit as
an ordinary monopolist.
Proposition 4. The service provider realizes expected profits equivalent
to monopoly profits in the uninformed segment of the market for currency
conversion.
Proof. As in the proof of Proposition 3, we consider the convexified problem
Π∗(q) ≡ Π(fq, q) (18)
= maxf≥0 Π(f, q), (19)
for q ∈ [0, 1], where
















Recall that for q = 0 and q = 1, respectively, problem (19) corresponds to
the problem of the monopolist and the service provider. A straightforward








































so that ∂Π∗(q)/∂q = 0 for all q ∈ [0, 1]. The claim follows. 
There is an alternative way to prove Proposition 4, which may throw ad-
ditional light on the main results of this paper. By directly comparing the
optimization problem of the service provider (8) with that of the monopolist
(6), we see that the service provider optimally sets
f∗S = 2f
M − c. (25)





i.e., the service provider sets her fee f∗S such that the uninformed consumer’s
expected cost for the currency conversion precisely equals the monopoly fee.
Using these observations, it may be even more straightforward to verify
that the service provider’s expected profit must be the same as that of a
monopolist in the uninformed market.
Putting the pieces together, our analysis predicts that the introduction of
DCC into an otherwise competitive market for currency conversion creates
a substantial loss in social welfare.
Corollary 1. The market admittance of a DCC service provider lowers con-
sumer surplus and aggregate welfare to the same degree as the introduction
of a monopoly in the uninformed market segment.
Proof. Immediate from Proposition 1 and relationship (26). 
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5.2 An international free-rider problem
At a superficial level, Proposition 1 seems to suggest that regulators should
prohibit DCC.33 However, this conclusion is flawed as it ignores the inter-
national dimension of the problem. Specifically, it must be noted that, for a
national regulatory authority, the identified gain in producer surplus arising
from international payments is of a domestic nature, while the correspond-
ing loss in consumer surplus from such transactions is of an entirely foreign
nature. For instance, in the introductory example, the Canadian regulator
might listen more intensely to local merchants than to US consumer interest
groups. Thus, national supervisors should wish to prohibit DCC abroad but
not domestically.34 We argue that this lack of reciprocity, which we could
not see reflected in the written accounts on DCC, creates a global free-rider
problem that is not easily resolved.
There are two caveats, however. First, suppose that the DCC model
is embedded into a Rochet-Tirole (2002) framework, so that issuers would
request interchange fees from acquirers. These probably could be differenti-
ated with respect to currency. Then, a share of the producer surplus would
end up in the hands of the issuers, which might mitigate (but not elimi-
nate) the problem. Another caveat is that, ultimately, the higher profits
from DCC might help to provide stronger incentives to invest in socially
desirable payment infrastructure (e.g., Reisinger and Zenger, 2019).35
33Alternatively, regulators could promote mandatory disclosure, competition among
service providers, or voluntary self-restriction by merchants.
34Supra-national regulators in the European Union may be in a similar situation, given
that the large majority of member countries uses the euro as official currency.
35However, the extent to which these considerations matter depends on the relative
bargaining power of the involved parties, which is an empirical issue that has, to our
knowledge, not been investigated so far.
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6. More than one service provider
A natural question to ask is why competition among service providers would
not eliminate the problem of excessive fees. To answer this question, we
briefly outline two possible extensions to k ≥ 2 service providers.
Extension A. Suppose first that service providers compete in an ex-ante
stage before the payment stage modeled so far, so that only one service
provider is visible to the consumer. Assume also that each service provider
offers a sharing rule (between the merchant and the service provider) for the
fees earned through currency conversions. In that case, service providers
would bid each other down to marginal cost, and leave all the revenues from
DCC to the merchant. However, the conclusions of our analysis do not
change. The only change necessary to reflect the new assumption is that
the merchant takes the role of the service provider.
Extension B. Suppose next that the DCC technology allows making more
than one DCC service provider visible to the consumer, in which case service
providers compete at the payment stage. Then, a straightforward extension
of our analysis implies that the service providers would (again) bid each
other down. As a result, there would be no excessive fees from DCC. While
this sounds like a resolution of our problem, it relies on the assumption
that the merchant, as a designer of the payment process, has an interest
in fostering competition among service providers to occur at the payment
stage. This outcome of the design process, however, is not plausible, as it
would bite into the merchant’s own share of DCC profits.
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7. Conclusion
The game-theoretic analysis conducted in the present paper adds support
to the view that DCC service providers are able to extract substantial rents
from cross-currency consumers by imposing an opportunistically framed
choice upon them. For the consumer that is averse to ambiguity, and
that lacks the informational basis for a good decision, conscious random-
ization may be the only optimal way to respond. Provided that competitive
forces work among issuers, this allows the service provider to charge fees
strictly above the monopoly level. The specific technological environment of
cross-currency payment may therefore overturn, and even reverse, the usual
welfare-enhancing effect of competition. Policy responses are available, in
principle, but our results suggest that a free-rider problem might make it
hard to reach an international agreement. Our analysis thereby provides an
explanation of the persistence of the DCC debacle despite the sizable body
of evidence that has been collected by consumer interest groups.
It should be clear that our theory is complementary to the findings of
the much richer literature on interchange fees in the tradition of Baxter
(1983) and Rochet and Tirole (2002). However, our observation regard-
ing the non-competitive nature of DCC may also have implications for the
level of interchange fees. Specifically, to the extent that issuers possess mar-
ket power vis-à-vis merchants, interchange fees resulting from international
transactions would reflect the share of the profits from DCC that an issuer
is able to extract (as a fourth party besides merchant, acquirer, and service
provider). Thus, our analysis suggests also an alternative explanation for
why interchange fees have often been found to be higher than the efficient
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level.36
The present paper has not addressed all aspects of DCC. For example,
by assuming that individual consumers have a unit demand for currency
conversion, we have ignored the fact that some of the processing costs arise
per transaction while others are linked to the amount. However, we believe
that incorporating this distinction would not lead to additional conclusions.
Further, it might be of interest to study how competition among merchants
interferes with the service provider’s ability to extract extraordinary rents.
Again, we believe that such competition should play only a subordinate
role in the global free-rider problem identified in the present analysis (e.g.,
because, for the merchant, the competitive gains from announcing that DCC
is not applied are probably negligible compared to her profit share from
DCC), but leave a more careful analysis of this issue for future work.
Appendix. Technical proofs
This appendix contains the proof of Proposition 2. The proof has five steps.
A.1 Derivation of aggregate demand
We start by considering informed and uninformed demand separately. An
informed consumer knows the state of the world and, hence, is able to guar-
antee herself the lowest fee in the market, i.e., min(f, fS). Therefore, a total
of DI(min(f, fS)) informed consumers request the currency conversion ser-
vice. Provided that the informed consumer’s willingness to pay for currency
conversion weakly exceeds min(f, fS), the expected profit of issuer i ∈ N
36See, e.g., Wright (2012) and Bedre-Defolie and Calvano (2013).
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from this consumer is given as




if fi = f < fS
fi − c
m+ 1
if fi = f = fS
0 otherwise.
(27)
Similarly, the expected profit of the service provider from the same informed
consumer is given as
ΠIS(f1, . . . , fn; fS) =

fS − c if fS < f
fi − c
m+ 1
if fS = f
0 otherwise.
(28)
The uninformed consumer does not know the state of the world. Random-






Consequently, a total of DU (E[f ]) uninformed consumers request the ser-
vice of currency conversion. The expected profit of issuer i ∈ N from an
uninformed consumer with willingness to pay weakly exceeding E[f ] is given
as




if fi = f ,
0 otherwise.
(30)
Similarly, the expected profit of the service provider from the same unin-
formed consumer is given as




Using the type-specific profit functions derived above, it is now easy to spell
out the aggregate demand for the competing firms. Specifically, the expected
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profit of issuer i ∈ N is given as
Πi(f1, . . . , fn; fS) = αDI(min(f, fS))Π
I
i (f1, . . . , fn; fS) (32)
+(1− α)DU (E[f ])ΠUi (f1, . . . , fn; fS).
Similarly, the service provider’s expected profit is given as
ΠS(f1, . . . , fn; fS) = αDI(min(f, fS))Π
I
S(f1, . . . , fn; fS) (33)
+(1− α)DU (E[f ])ΠUS (f1, . . . , fn; fS).
A.2 Existence of f∗S













admits a solution f∗S . By Assumption 1, the objective function in (34) is
positive at fS = c + ε, for ε > 0 small enough. Therefore, given that














In fact, it suffices to show that
lim
f→∞
fDU (f) = 0. (36)
Indeed, if (36) holds, then also cDU (f) tends to zero as f →∞, so that (35)
holds true. There are now two cases. If DU (f) = 0 for some finite f , then
(36) is immediate. Suppose, therefore, that DU (f) > 0 for any f ≥ 0. By
Assumption 1, DU is ρ-concave for some ρ > −1. Recall that smaller values
of ρ correspond to less stringent conditions on DU (Caplin and Nalebuff,
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1991). Therefore, we may assume without loss of generality that ρ ∈ (−1, 0).
In this case, the strictly increasing transformation ϕρ(Q) = Q
ρ/ρ assumes
negative values only (for Q > 0). Moreover, by Assumption 1, DU (c) is
finite. Therefore, the transformed function ϕρ(DU (f)) is negative, strictly
declining, and concave on [c,∞). Hence, as illustrated in Figure 2, we find
an absolute slope parameter L > 0 such that
ϕρ(DU (f)) ≤ −Lf , (37)







As the right-hand side of inequality (38) tends to zero as f →∞, this proves
(36). The claim follows.
Figure 2. Determination of the slope parameter L
A.3 Uniqueness of f∗S













is strictly quasi-concave on the subinterval of (0,∞) where uninformed de-
mand is positive. Indeed, consider a fee level fS ≥ c satisfying DU (fS) > 0
and Π′S(fS) = 0. It suffices to show that Π
′′
S(fS) < 0 (Diewert et al., 1981).





































Multiplying both sides of equation (41) by 1/DU and subsequently using




















or, equivalently, Π′′S(fS) < 0. Therefore, the function ΠS defined through
equation (39) is indeed strictly quasi-concave on the subinterval of (0,∞)
where uninformed demand is positive. Since the service provider can guar-
antee herself a positive payoff by charging a fee slightly above marginal cost,
any global maximum must be in this subinterval. Hence, there is at most
one maximizer.
A.4 Equilibrium property
Clearly, no issuer has an incentive to operate below marginal cost. Suppose
that some issuer i raises her fee above marginal cost. Then, she clearly
loses all her business with the informed consumers. However, issuer i also
loses all her business with the uninformed consumers, because those can
still discriminate among issuers. Thus, issuer i has no incentive to deviate.
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As for the service provider, a deviation to some price level fS ≤ c is never
optimal. Similarly, a deviation to some price level fS ∈ (c, f∗S) ∪ (f∗S ,∞)
strictly lowers the profit from the business with the uninformed because f∗
optimizes equation (5), and does not attract any informed consumer because
informed consumers know the state of the world and would select the lower
fees offered by the issuers.
A.5 Equilibrium uniqueness
To provoke a contradiction, suppose that there is a pure-strategy Nash
equilibrium with fees f1, . . . , fn and fS that differs from the equilibrium
described in the proposition. Extending the proof of uniqueness given in
Proposition 1, it is not feasible that f 6= c in equilibrium. Hence f = c, and
all issuers set their fees equal to c because of the second-order lexicographic
preference for market share. But given f1 = f2 · · · = fn = c, fS = f∗S must
hold in equilibrium. This concludes the proof of equilibrium uniqueness,
and thereby, of the proposition. 
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